The U.S. mission to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu has woefully underperformed on several important metrics throughout the Biden administration.
It seems reasonable to pin some of these performance issues on the foreign service officers who served at the post over the last four years. At a minimum, they bear considerable responsibility for underperformance with respect to issues with strategic planning and strategic communications.
However, it would be unfair to hold the mission staff responsible for the entirety of the underperformance that has occurred at the diplomatic posts.
The White House, United States Congress and Office of the Inspector General of the Department of State also bear considerable responsibility for failing to act, conducting insufficient oversight, and failing to conduct proper inspections.
The Trump Transition Team should not only be mindful of these performance issues and their root causes. They should also seek to address them within the first 100 Days.
The team could start with these five recommendations:
First, the U.S. Department of State should address the naming of the complex of U.S. diplomatic posts that are located in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The official website of the U.S. embassies in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu continues to be called the "U.S. Embassy in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu." This is two years after the opening of the U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands and a year after the opening of the U.S. embassy in Vanuatu. After those changes, the word embassy should have been changed from singular to plural when referring to the three diplomatic posts as a complex. That oversight speaks volumes to the lack of attention to detail in public diplomacy at the post.
Second, the U.S. Department of State should address the virtual footprint of the complex of diplomatic posts in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. There is an official website for the U.S. Mission to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu but there are no standalone websites for each of these Pacific nations. A review of the virtual footprint of other U.S. diplomatic missions shows that this is a remarkable state of affairs.
There are no U.S. diplomatic posts in Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. However, the State Department has created standalone or embedded virtual embassy websites for each of those locations. There are also standalone websites for the U.S. embassies in Libya, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen, even though their operations are currently suspended. There is even a U.S. virtual embassy for Iran, despite the fact that there are no diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States.
Third, the U.S. Department of State should address the gap in mission strategic plans for Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. There is a single Integrated Country Strategy for Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Remarkably, that mission strategic plan was approved for release on March 21, 2022. That was over five months before the hosting of the First United States–Pacific Island Country Summit and release of the Pacific Partnership Strategy, 10 months before the opening of the U.S. embassy in Solomon Islands, and two years before the opening of the U.S. embassy in Vanuatu.
As a matter of policy, an Integrated Country Strategy is a multi-year plan that declares the whole-of-government priorities of the United States in a given country. While missions often deviate, the plain meaning of the phrase “in a given country” suggests that there should be a standalone Integrated Country Strategy for every independent state of concurrent representation. Whether that is the right approach is beyond the scope of this article. What matters is that the guidance and instructions given to the chiefs of the mission is that their country teams are to regularly review their strategic plan and make revisions whenever there are major events leading to fundamental changes in diplomatic relations. That standard was not met in the case of the U.S. Mission to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
Fourth, the White House and the U.S. Congress should address the gap in mission leadership that persisted under the Biden administration. On July 11, 2022, President Joe Biden announced his intent to concurrently nominate Ann Marie Yastishock as U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. More than 16 months later, Yastishock finally received a confirmation from the U.S. Senate. There was then a delay in her arrival at post until Feb. 2, 2024. Consequently, the U.S. Mission to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu did not have full executive leadership for the supra majority of the Biden administration.
The U.S. embassies in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu fared even worse. On July 11, 2024, President Biden announced his intent to nominate Keith Hanigan as U.S. ambassador to the Solomon Islands. In the end, Hanigan never received a confirmation. That meant both new embassies never had the benefit of independent executive leadership under the Biden administration.
Fifth, the State Department Office of the Inspector General should address the gap in inspections of the U.S. embassies in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 requires the inspector general to inspect every U.S. diplomatic post at least once every five years. However, that requirement is often waived by the U.S. Congress. As a result, the last inspection of the U.S. Mission in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu was between June 9 and June 28, 2016. Remarkably, that inspection found that the mission leadership had failed to produce an effective strategic plan for achieving goals and measuring performance. Yet, there was no reinspection to confirm that corrective actions had been taken to change the strategic planning culture at U.S. Mission to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.
It is therefore not surprising that the mission and its offspring continue to struggle with strategic planning almost a decade later.
Michael Walsh is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Lasky Center for Transatlantic Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served as the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Security Affairs Subcommittee on the Biden Defense Working Group.
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