Japanese defense spending explodes; highest since WWII
Spending 1.6 percent of GDP on defense is considered normal for much of the world. Not in Japan. Up until 2022, the Land of the Rising Sun spent less than 0.5 percent year-on-year. However, in 2023, Japan became the land of the rising defense budget.
Japanese defense spending grew by 27 percent in 2023 and will rise by another 17 percent in 2024, reaching ¥8trn ($51bn) in current prices. It is outspending China (1.19 percent), and its defense budget is at the highest point in modern history. It is expected to continue growing, with the government aiming to hit 2 percent by 2027.
So, why the sudden change? And should the Pacific be worried or heartened?
In late 2022, Japan embarked on an ambitious program to bolster its defenses, as outlined in three key national security documents. War in Ukraine, the rise of China and North Korea’s nuclear testing program have given reasons for the Japanese to worry.
China, Russia and North Korea, which surround Japan, all have nuclear weapons. Japan has land disputes with Russia in the North Pacific and China in the South China Sea. In Korea, it has a bad colonial reputation, and relations with China, which dominates the East China Sea, have soured. The two are barely on speaking terms.
Then, of course, there are concerns about China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, where most countries are allied with Japan and the U.S. There's a likelihood that NATO would not come to the defense of Guam, the CNMI, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia because they are not covered by Article V. In which case, U.S. alliances, such as with Japan, will likely be the default reinforcement in the event a conflict erupts in the region.
As part of its new strategy, Japan aims to spend 2 percent of GDP by 2027. Tokyo hopes to accomplish this figure by allocating a total of ¥43 trillion for defense-related spending. That would mean Japan spends as much on defense as NATO countries are expected to. Much of the new defense spending is designed to combat its direct threats head-on.
Cash injections to its coast guard, the building of naval vessels, increasing missile launching and defense capabilities, submarine detectors, extra fighter jets and other maritime transport have all gone ahead.
Japan has also eased curbs on weapons exports. Under certain conditions, Japan can now supply lethal weapons and munitions to other countries for the first time. It has already sent patriot missiles to the U.S., which is trying to replenish stocks, and the U.K. is also said to be interested in Japanese artillery rounds, as its stocks have been depleted by aiding Ukraine.
Since 2022, Japan has signed a string of new defense pacts with Australia, the U.K. and, more recently, the Philippines. This pact would allow Japan to station troops in the Philippines for joint military drills for the first time since Japan’s brutal occupation in World War II.
The U.S. also announced a revamp and upgrade of its military command in Japan at a 2+2 meeting in July with the Japanese defense and foreign secretaries. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin affirmed that the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the cornerstone of regional peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan has had a tricky relationship with its military since the end of WWII, and a Japanese military buildup has long been a sensitive issue for Pacific nations. Many of Japan’s neighbors in the Pacific came under its occupation at the turn of the twentieth century and throughout WWII.
Japan’s post-war constitution, drafted under U.S. occupation, was designed to demilitarize Japan. The constitution stipulates that its military must be exclusively defense-oriented and pacifist. Much of its external security issues have been delegated to the U.S. as the Land of the Rising Sun focuses meticulously on economic development.
When the Korean war broke out in 1950, the Japanese government, with U.S. backing, established the armed police known as the Self-Defense Force for internal security. It was always extremely modest in size and politicians kept its growth to a minimum. The unwritten rule was no more than 1 percent of GNP, although this figure was rarely reached.
As the war faded further into the past, new threats emerged, namely natural disasters. Disaster-relief efforts after major earthquakes in 1995 and 2011 helped make the Self-Defense Forces one of Japan’s most trusted institutions, with more than 90 percent of Japanese having a positive impression of it.
Nowadays, ties between these nations and Japan have steadily deepened, especially in the first part of the twenty-first century. In the 1960s, most cooperation concerned fishing and economic development. Since the 1980s, it has evolved to include climate and disaster management, law enforcement and, gradually, security has come onto the agenda.
Tokyo faces numerous problems with its skyrocketing defense spending. The Japanese yen is weak. New taxes are likely to be imposed to hit the 2 percent figure, which the government admits it is not completely wedded to.
Further, long-standing restrictions on the military have shocked the production industries. Ramping up production will take time. Then comes the issue of manpower. The Self-Defense Forces are facing recruitment problems and missed their latest recruitment targets by half. Surveys show the Japanese rank among the lowest of people prepared to fight for their country. This is before questions of Japan’s aging population are addressed.
That being said, Tokyo and the Indo-Pacific recognize the need for strength in this region. Japanese support and friendship should be welcomed, as it is well-placed to help deter China. Without NATO protection, Japan and its Self-Defense Forces could end up being the last resort when defending the Pacific.
That Japan has taken these drastic steps is very indicative of the times we are living through. It is only natural that Pacific islanders remember the past with bitterness and anger, but, as the old saying goes, history is an assault on the present.
Dr. James C. Pearce previously worked at the University of Liverpool and the College of the Marshall Islands, and lived in Russia for almost a decade. He is the author of “The Use of History in Putin's Russia” and has written on Russian memory politics, historical narratives, education policy and historical anniversaries. Send feedback to jcpearce.91@gmail.com.
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