On Oct. 1, 2024, Palau marked the 30th anniversary of its independence. The two other freely associated states, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, became independent in 1986 and are now celebrating their 38th year as "sovereign" nations.
Because the FSM and the Marshall Islands compacts were signed and ratified earlier, their financial arrangements and monitoring differed from Palau’s.
After signing the compact, Palau went through eight ratification elections before passage in 1993. These multiple elections created much confusion and a crisis climate in Palau over several years. The nuclear-free provision needed to be overcome. It wasn’t like the World Series best out of 7. Only the last one counted. Previous to that, the compact was 0 and 7. Traditional leaders, activists and baseball fans in Palau knew that score.
I was then Guahan’s newly elected delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives,
tasked with representing the U.S. Congress at the Independence Day celebration. It was the first time I was driven around like a dignitary with two flags on the limo. I insisted on flying the Guam flag and was announced to the assembled thousands of citizens. It was a great honor for me, but no doubt there were Palau officials who felt that sending the Guam delegate was not commensurate with the importance of the ceremony. I concur with that assessment.
It still is difficult to assess the meaning of “independence” for freely associated states, which have signed over defense responsibilities and foreign affairs related to “security” to their former colonial power.
The operational definition of “security” changes over time, depending on the needs and perspective of the United States. During the Cold War, “strategic denial” was sufficient. Now, “strategic affirmation” via military bases, high-level exercises involving multiple countries and new units such as the Joint Task Force Micronesia are part of the changing Micronesian scene.
Established earlier this year, the task force’s stated mission is “to synchronize operations and activities across all domains, enabling a robust warfighting posture while enhancing partner nation capacity.” This was also accompanied by U.S. funding of “security advisers” for each of the three executives of the COFA states.
There is a lot of activity, including the movement of a Chinese ICBM directly across the region (possibly right over Guahan), in late September. Fired by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, this reminder of China’s capabilities will increase conversations about air missile defense systems in Guahan and the related and supportive activities in other parts of the region.
The Danish Institute for International Studies defines “free association” as a “politico-juridical status that originates in a series of efforts by the United Nations to encourage transition from non-self-governing territories to sovereign states.” They are sovereign political entities with the caveat that some authority is given to the former colonial or administering power, especially in security and defense issues.
They seem to be on a trajectory toward full independence. In the meantime, they are fully “sovereign,” interacting with other independent nations recognized by the United Nations and other international bodies.
If this is the process toward independence, could other processes and trajectories be at work? Is it possible that the freely associated states are being integrated into the American political framework instead of becoming more autonomous? Are the compacts becoming more compact and less free? The immediate answer might be that this is consistent with free association, if both sides agree to it.
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This tautological explanation can be used to describe the increasingly entangled and intertwined relationship between the independent nations of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and Washington D.C. But is this a normal kind of international arrangement or marriage between sovereign entities acting in their own best interests? Or is this a shotgun wedding? Who is the best man? It isn’t China.
The COFA agreements have three benefits to the compact nations and their citizens: economic assistance, visa-free entry for their citizens and the right to join the U.S. military. We can legitimately argue over whether access to the U.S. Postal Service is an economic benefit, a subsidy or further entanglement. It feels different since the COFA states can sell stamps while U.S. territories cannot. Hey, there is an idea.
The “rights” definitely create a more complicated relationship. The plight of COFA migrants in terms of their collective “impact” on local jurisdictions, access to social programs and complex immigration status had led to several congressional initiatives over the years. The Compact Impact Fairness Act passed this year clarifies that the migrants will have access to permanent resident-type benefits such as Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.
While hailed as a long-overdue solution, this “compact impact aid” only relieves the burden on individual states like Hawaii and Arkansas, while throwing Guahan and the Northern Marianas under the proverbial bus.
The real story is more nuanced. The COFA communities, especially in Hawaii and Arkansas, were incredibly active and behaved like a “domestic” constituency inside those states. This “victory” could be credited more to them than their own home governments, which seemed passive in this “victory.” The fact that the Micronesian and Marshallese leaders living in those U.S. states are strong-minded women is also remarkable.
The right to join the military has created yet another “domestic” constituency in the name of veterans. If they are allowed, even encouraged, to join the U.S. military, then they shouldn’t have to keep going to Hawaii or Guahan to get benefits. This is a well-worn road for Guahan veterans who have bemoaned the reality of going to Hawaii, although they now have a “clinic” near the Naval Hospital in Agana Heights.
The recently passed COFA Veterans Act would bring the VA benefit coverage to the freely associated states. This legislation was—again— led by the Hawaii and Arkansas congressional delegations. The original sponsors included the delegate from American Samoa, but not from Guahan.
In the justification for this act, COFA state leaders made their case sounding more like an aggrieved domestic constituency rather than heads of state.
This “victory” now extends domestic VA benefits inside the independent countries in the region.
It only seems fair, and there is no need, to pit one set of “domestic” Pacific Islanders against another. In a statement, Adam Robinson, director of the VA’s Pacific Islands Health Care System, clarified that adding services to the COFA veterans “will not detract in any way from the care that Pacific island veterans in Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, American Samoa and the Hawaiian Islands already enjoy.”
These measures represent the next logical step in an entangled web of relationships between sovereign entities, which challenge the very definition of “sovereignty.” It requires some redefinition and analysis of sovereignty, independence, co-dependence, domestic constituency rights and responsibilities. For the freely associated states, is this is going back in the trajectory toward independence.
In the meantime, the COFA communities in U.S. territories will continue to make noise and demands. While they do not vote in U.S. elections, they can and do vote in elections “back home.” Their influence remains large and their votes can sometimes sway the election results. They are a domestic constituency in two different countries, or perhaps just two different jurisdictions under the same flag.
Dr. Robert Underwood is the former president of the University of Guam and former member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Send feedback to anacletus2010@gmail.com.
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