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A false sense of security



Pacific Reflections By Gabriel McCoard  

It turns out that Hawaii is not officially part of NATO. The more I’ve thought about it, the less surprised I am.  


To explain why, let me share a fishing story. Don’t worry, I won’t be bragging. I didn’t catch anything.


I was once in Pohnpei when my host invited me to go fishing with his family. Which is to say that I watched while they fished and I tried not to get tangled up in a nearly invisible line that, with the right tug from the right tuna, could slice my finger off. Or so I imagined.


As the shore became a faint blur in what I, with my North American sensibilities,  would describe as an oversized canoe, the waves got taller, the ride rougher. My guide knocked on the gunwale and told me the name of our vessel: “False Sense of Security.”


We then peered into the murky depths as he echoed one of my pet theories about U.S. military access in the Pacific: “I bet there are Trident-carrying submarines down there.”


Despite the anti-nuclear clauses embedded in the constitutions of each of the Compact of Free Association jurisdictions, my oft-repeated suspicion is that the U.S. is running nuclear submarines through the territorial sea of each COFA republic pretty regularly.


I thought about this while considering the Hawaii-NATO question.  


If Hawaii were to be attacked, the military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not help the U.S.—a founder and funder of NATO –in defending one of its own states.


Or would it?


Born from the ashes of World War II, NATO set the stage for the Cold War. When the never-warm relationship between wartime allies the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics frosted over, Europe began to splinter along long-simmering fault lines between avowed Communists and devoted non-Communists. Winston Churchill decried the iron curtain falling across Eastern Europe, and with the establishment of the United Nations came an understanding that nations had an inherent right to defend themselves and, if so motivated, their allies.


And so Europe fell into two broad camps:  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (more or less aligned with the U.S. and not being Communist) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (more or less aligned with Moscow and being Communist).


While this was happening, a thorny question arose: given the number of soon-to-be independent nations insisting on no longer being European colonies, would members of NATO be obligated to defend a remote colony from a Communist Party takeover, or, say, a violent threat from the Natives? Think, the Congo and Vietnam.


The original 12 countries that signed the treaty chose a line on the globe to protect: north of the Tropic of Cancer, roughly the northern edge of the tropics and just a few degrees beyond the then-territory of Hawaii.


But there was a solution: other regional mutual defense treaties.  Like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.


Then again, those fizzled out pretty quickly.


If Hawaii were to experience another Pearl Harbor-type attack, would NATO join the U.S. in whatever came next? Probably.


 NATO is getting more active in the Pacific. We know why: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several member countries have accused China and North Korea of directly supporting Russia.


NATO, for its part, has expressed that protecting Europe requires a global focus and is engaging more with its Indo-Pacific partners, namely South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.


Given India’s not-entirely-hostile stance toward Russia, the Indo-Pacific partnership might be seeing less Indo.


NATO could change its charter to incorporate Hawaii. Good luck convincing 32 nations to do that, especially given Türkiye’s hostility to Sweden’s accession. Or, in the event of an attack, they could just decide to respond.


Or perhaps the focus on NATO is misdirected.


The U.S. could just respond on its own. After all, the U.S. spends more on defense than the next nine countries combined and is NATO’s largest funder.


What about Guam? Or Micronesia?


I have a difficult time believing that an attack on U.S. assets in the Pacific would be an isolated Sept. 11 or Oct. 7 non-state-actor type of action. Any attack would be with the expectation (hope?) of a wider war.


I also suspect that Taiwan would be the first Pacific target, given the uncertainty of U.S. defense obligations.


I suspect the question is not about NATO itself, but whether Western-think multilateralism has instilled a false sense of security in itself. Not about any military capability, be it NATO or the U.S., but whether Western institutions can survive the onslaught of challenges to its self-perceived invincibility. Democracy over autocracy. Free markets over central economic planning. 


As for my fishing trip, that night I caught a flight to Chuuk State while second-guessing its role in multilateralism in a region that the world is suddenly interested in.


 I’ll say this about Chuuk: you’ll never develop a false sense of security there.


Gabriel McCoard is an attorney who previously worked in Palau and Chuuk State. Send feedback to gabrieljmccoard@hotmail.com.

 



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